RIP: Use message authentication interface
Based on former commit from Pavel Tvrdik
This commit is contained in:
parent
64385aee0c
commit
390601f038
8 changed files with 100 additions and 34 deletions
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@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
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#define ALG_SHA256 0x04
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#define ALG_SHA384 0x05
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#define ALG_SHA512 0x06
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#define ALG_HMAC 0x10
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#define ALG_HMAC_MD5 0x11
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#define ALG_HMAC_SHA1 0x12
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#define ALG_HMAC_SHA224 0x13
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@ -34,6 +35,9 @@
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#define HASH_STORAGE sizeof(struct sha512_context)
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#define MAC_STORAGE sizeof(struct hmac_context)
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/* This value is used by several IETF protocols for padding */
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#define HMAC_MAGIC htonl(0x878FE1F3)
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/* Generic context used by hash functions */
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struct hash_context
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{
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10
lib/string.h
10
lib/string.h
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@ -39,6 +39,16 @@ xstrdup(const char *c)
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return z;
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}
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static inline void
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memset32(void *D, u32 val, uint n)
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{
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u32 *dst = D;
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uint i;
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for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
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dst[i] = val;
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}
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#define ROUTER_ID_64_LENGTH 23
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#endif
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@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
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#include "nest/bird.h"
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#include "nest/password.h"
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#include "lib/string.h"
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#include "lib/mac.h"
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struct password_item *last_password_item = NULL;
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@ -66,3 +67,17 @@ password_find_by_value(list *l, char *pass, uint size)
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return NULL;
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}
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uint
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max_mac_length(list *l)
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{
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struct password_item *pi;
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uint val = 0;
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if (!l)
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return 0;
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WALK_LIST(pi, *l)
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val = MAX(val, mac_type_length(pi->alg));
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return val;
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}
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@ -34,4 +34,6 @@ static inline int password_verify(struct password_item *p1, char *p2, uint size)
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return !memcmp(buf, p2, size);
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}
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uint max_mac_length(list *l);
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#endif
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@ -98,15 +98,29 @@ rip_iface_start:
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rip_iface_finish:
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{
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/* Default mode is broadcast for RIPv1, multicast for RIPv2 and RIPng */
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if (!RIP_IFACE->mode)
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RIP_IFACE->mode = (rip_cfg_is_v2() && (RIP_IFACE->version == RIP_V1)) ?
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RIP_IM_BROADCAST : RIP_IM_MULTICAST;
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RIP_IFACE->passwords = get_passwords();
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if (!RIP_IFACE->auth_type != !RIP_IFACE->passwords)
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log(L_WARN "Authentication and password options should be used together");
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/* Default mode is broadcast for RIPv1, multicast for RIPv2 and RIPng */
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if (!RIP_IFACE->mode)
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RIP_IFACE->mode = (rip_cfg_is_v2() && (RIP_IFACE->version == RIP_V1)) ?
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RIP_IM_BROADCAST : RIP_IM_MULTICAST;
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if (RIP_IFACE->passwords)
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{
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struct password_item *pass;
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WALK_LIST(pass, *RIP_IFACE->passwords)
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{
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if (pass->alg && (RIP_IFACE->auth_type != RIP_AUTH_CRYPTO))
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cf_error("Password algorithm option requires cryptographic authentication");
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/* Set default crypto algorithm (MD5) */
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if (!pass->alg && (RIP_IFACE->auth_type == RIP_AUTH_CRYPTO))
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pass->alg = ALG_MD5;
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}
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}
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RIP_CFG->min_timeout_time = MIN_(RIP_CFG->min_timeout_time, RIP_IFACE->timeout_time);
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RIP_CFG->max_garbage_time = MAX_(RIP_CFG->max_garbage_time, RIP_IFACE->garbage_time);
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@ -10,7 +10,6 @@
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*/
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#include "rip.h"
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#include "lib/md5.h"
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#include "lib/mac.h"
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@ -18,9 +17,7 @@
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#define RIP_CMD_RESPONSE 2 /* responding to request */
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#define RIP_BLOCK_LENGTH 20
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#define RIP_PASSWD_LENGTH 16
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#define RIP_MD5_LENGTH 16
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#define RIP_AF_IPV4 2
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#define RIP_AF_AUTH 0xffff
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@ -73,7 +70,7 @@ struct rip_auth_tail
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{
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u16 must_be_ffff;
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u16 must_be_0001;
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byte auth_data[];
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byte auth_data[0];
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};
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/* Internal representation of RTE block data */
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@ -221,16 +218,24 @@ rip_fill_authentication(struct rip_proto *p, struct rip_iface *ifa, struct rip_p
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auth->auth_type = htons(RIP_AUTH_CRYPTO);
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auth->packet_len = htons(*plen);
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auth->key_id = pass->id;
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auth->auth_len = sizeof(struct rip_auth_tail) + RIP_MD5_LENGTH;
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auth->auth_len = mac_type_length(pass->alg);
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auth->seq_num = ifa->csn_ready ? htonl(ifa->csn) : 0;
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auth->unused1 = 0;
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auth->unused2 = 0;
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ifa->csn_ready = 1;
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if (pass->alg < ALG_HMAC)
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auth->auth_len += sizeof(struct rip_auth_tail);
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/*
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* Note that RFC 4822 is unclear whether auth_len should cover whole
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* authentication trailer or just auth_data length.
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*
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* FIXME: We should use just auth_data length by default. Currently we put
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* the whole auth trailer length in keyed hash case to keep old behavior,
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* but we put just auth_data length in the new HMAC case. Note that Quagga
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* has config option for this.
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*
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* Crypto sequence numbers are increased by sender in rip_update_csn().
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* First CSN should be zero, this is handled by csn_ready.
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*/
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@ -238,14 +243,18 @@ rip_fill_authentication(struct rip_proto *p, struct rip_iface *ifa, struct rip_p
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struct rip_auth_tail *tail = (void *) ((byte *) pkt + *plen);
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tail->must_be_ffff = htons(0xffff);
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tail->must_be_0001 = htons(0x0001);
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strncpy(tail->auth_data, pass->password, RIP_MD5_LENGTH);
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*plen += sizeof(struct rip_auth_tail) + RIP_MD5_LENGTH;
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uint auth_len = mac_type_length(pass->alg);
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*plen += sizeof(struct rip_auth_tail) + auth_len;
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struct hash_context ctx;
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md5_init(&ctx);
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md5_update(&ctx, (byte *) pkt, *plen);
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memcpy(tail->auth_data, md5_final(&ctx), RIP_MD5_LENGTH);
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/* Append key for keyed hash, append padding for HMAC (RFC 4822 2.5) */
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if (pass->alg < ALG_HMAC)
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strncpy(tail->auth_data, pass->password, auth_len);
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else
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memset32(tail->auth_data, HMAC_MAGIC, auth_len / 4);
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mac_fill(pass->alg, pass->password, pass->length,
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(byte *) pkt, *plen, tail->auth_data);
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return;
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default:
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@ -288,13 +297,25 @@ rip_check_authentication(struct rip_proto *p, struct rip_iface *ifa, struct rip_
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DROP("no suitable password found", auth->key_id);
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uint data_len = ntohs(auth->packet_len);
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uint auth_len = sizeof(struct rip_auth_tail) + RIP_MD5_LENGTH;
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uint auth_len = mac_type_length(pass->alg);
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uint auth_len2 = sizeof(struct rip_auth_tail) + auth_len;
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if (data_len + auth_len != *plen)
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DROP("packet length mismatch", data_len);
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/*
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* Ideally, first check should be check for internal consistency:
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* (data_len + sizeof(struct rip_auth_tail) + auth->auth_len) != *plen
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*
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* Second one should check expected code length:
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* auth->auth_len != auth_len
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*
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* But as auth->auth_len has two interpretations, we simplify this
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*/
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if ((auth->auth_len != RIP_MD5_LENGTH) && (auth->auth_len != auth_len))
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DROP("authentication data length mismatch", auth->auth_len);
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if (data_len + auth_len2 != *plen)
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DROP("packet length mismatch", *plen);
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/* Warning: two interpretations of auth_len field */
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if ((auth->auth_len != auth_len) && (auth->auth_len != auth_len2))
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DROP("wrong authentication length", auth->auth_len);
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struct rip_auth_tail *tail = (void *) ((byte *) pkt + data_len);
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if ((tail->must_be_ffff != htons(0xffff)) || (tail->must_be_0001 != htons(0x0001)))
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@ -312,17 +333,18 @@ rip_check_authentication(struct rip_proto *p, struct rip_iface *ifa, struct rip_
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return 0;
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}
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char received[RIP_MD5_LENGTH];
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memcpy(received, tail->auth_data, RIP_MD5_LENGTH);
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strncpy(tail->auth_data, pass->password, RIP_MD5_LENGTH);
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byte *auth_data = alloca(auth_len);
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memcpy(auth_data, tail->auth_data, auth_len);
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struct hash_context ctx;
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md5_init(&ctx);
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md5_update(&ctx, (byte *) pkt, *plen);
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char *computed = md5_final(&ctx);
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/* Append key for keyed hash, append padding for HMAC (RFC 4822 2.5) */
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if (pass->alg < ALG_HMAC)
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strncpy(tail->auth_data, pass->password, auth_len);
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else
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memset32(tail->auth_data, HMAC_MAGIC, auth_len / 4);
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if (memcmp(received, computed, RIP_MD5_LENGTH))
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DROP("wrong MD5 digest", pass->id);
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if (!mac_verify(pass->alg, pass->password, pass->length,
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(byte *) pkt, *plen, auth_data))
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DROP("wrong authentication code", pass->id);
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*plen = data_len;
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n->csn = rcv_csn;
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@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ rip_iface_update_buffers(struct rip_iface *ifa)
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ifa->tx_plen = tbsize - headers;
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if (ifa->cf->auth_type == RIP_AUTH_CRYPTO)
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ifa->tx_plen -= RIP_AUTH_TAIL_LENGTH;
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ifa->tx_plen -= RIP_AUTH_TAIL_LENGTH + max_mac_length(ifa->cf->passwords);
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}
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static inline void
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@ -702,12 +702,11 @@ rip_reconfigure_iface(struct rip_proto *p, struct rip_iface *ifa, struct rip_ifa
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ifa->cf = new;
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rip_iface_update_buffers(ifa);
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if (ifa->next_regular > (now + new->update_time))
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ifa->next_regular = now + (random() % new->update_time) + 1;
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if ((new->tx_length != old->tx_length) || (new->rx_buffer != old->rx_buffer))
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rip_iface_update_buffers(ifa);
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if (new->check_link != old->check_link)
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rip_iface_update_state(ifa);
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@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
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#define RIP_NG_PORT 521 /* RIPng */
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#define RIP_MAX_PKT_LENGTH 532 /* 512 + IP4_HEADER_LENGTH */
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#define RIP_AUTH_TAIL_LENGTH 20 /* 4 + MD5 length */
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#define RIP_AUTH_TAIL_LENGTH 4 /* Without auth_data */
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#define RIP_DEFAULT_ECMP_LIMIT 16
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#define RIP_DEFAULT_INFINITY 16
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